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 Despite the existence of the CMUC, 7% of the French population remains 
without  complementary health insurance (CHI)
 This proportion is higher among households whose resources are just 
above the CMUC eligibility threshold and it strongly decreases with 
household income:
 19% of the first income decile
 14% of the second income decile
 In order to improve financial access to CHI and reduce the threshold 
effect induced by the CMUC
 a CHI voucher has been introduced in 2005,
 called Aide à la complémentaire santé – ACS
41. Context
 ACS is intended for people whose resources are between:
 the CMUC eligibility threshold and (627€ for a single)
 This threshold + 20% (752€)
 The voucher :
 is delivered by mandatory health insurance offices
 entitles to a price reduction for individual health insurance 
take-up
 covers, in average, 50% of the health insurance price
 Estimated ACS- eligible population: 2 millions 1. Context
























































































































































































































Number of  ACS beneficiaries since enactment in 20051. Aims of the study
 Despite a regular increase in uptake, 5 years after being 
set up the program concerns only a little under 500,000 
people. 
 Three main hypotheses may be proposed to explain the 
weakness of the efficacy of this subvention: 
1. Unaffordability of health insurance despite this financial aid
2. Lack of information (application process & program itself)
3. Voluntary trade-off between private consumption and 
health coverage. 
 In order to evaluate these hypotheses, we have developed 
an experiment with the National Health Insurance Fund. 
72. Potential Outcome Model




6.2. Potential Outcome Model
 Interested in estimating the causal effect of participating in some 
treatment on future outcomes
 Treatment is very broadly defined: it might refer to an actual 
intervention, choice variable, individual behavior, endogenous 
variable
 Counterfactual framework (Rubin, 1974):
 Each individual has two potential outcomes,      with treatment and      
without treatment
 Only one potential outcome is observed. The unobserved outcome is 
the counterfactual outcome
 For an individual the effect of participating in the treatment equals
 v
 is always unobserved because only one of the variable is observed
 Let’s define T an indicator for receiving treatment: 
 D   if individual received treatment, 0 otherwise
92. Potential Outcome Model
 3 parameters of interest:
 Average Treatment Effect (ATE):
 d
 Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET):
 d
 Average Treatment Effect on the Untreated (ATEU):
 Fsdfs
 In practice: 
 Main problem: treatment participation is often not independent of the 
potential outcomes, individuals self-select into treatment
 Individuals with positive      are more likely to participate 
 If there is self-selection:
 &
 Furthermore, we cannot estimate:                       & 
102. Potential Outcome Model
 Several methods have been developed to take 
into account this bias, in particular:
 Experimental design method
 Treatment is randomly assigned across individuals
 So treatment is statistically independent of potential 
outcomes
 Random assignment solves the self-selection problem




 The causal effect/treatment impact can then be estimated by 
difference in means between treated and untreated groups.
113. Experiment Design
4. Determinants of the demand for ACS





 A sample of 5,000 eligible households, according to their 
recorded resources, living in urban area in North of France 
(Lille city) and which were not previously benefiting from the 
ACS, has been randomly assigned into three groups: 
1. Control group benefiting from the current financial aid
2. First treated group benefiting from a 50% voucher increase
3. Second treated group benefiting from a 50% voucher increase 
and a social take-up support





Groups - 25 years 25 – 59 years 60 years & +
Control 100€ 200€ 400€
Treated 1 & 2 175€ 350€ 650€3. Experiment design
 The 3 groups received a letter explaining their eligibility to ACS and 
the amount of the voucher
 The 2nd treated group has been invited, one week later, to an 
information meeting provided by a social worker 
 These households were followed-up during 6 months (Jan-July 09) 
and we recorded:
 How many application forms were sent back
 How many of them entitled to ACS
 We also obtained administrative data from the National Health
Insurance Fund office in Lille (health insurance coverage,  health care consomptions and 
expenditures, sexe, age, … of the experimented population)
 Today’s presentation is based on these data
144. Determinants of the demand 
for ACS




3.4. Determinants of the demand for ACS
 Descriptive statistics of the experimented 
population:
 Homogeneity between groups (random assignment) 
 Equal proportions of men and women
 80% are between 25 and 59 years old and 10% are 
under the age of 25
 One month before experiment start, 1 insured person 
of 3 isn’t cover by a CHI, 
 while 50% of the insured family spend more than 1000€
in 2008 (500€ per persons)
174. Determinants of the demand for ACS
 First outcome variable: Proportion of returned 
application forms
1. Impact of the 50% voucher increase
 The proportion in the first treated group is significantly 
higher than in the control group (5% level)
 Elasticity of the subvention increase is equal to 0.22
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Groups Number of returned
application forms
Total number of 
individuals %
Control 241 1679 14.4
Treated 1 281 1685 16.7
Treated 2 229 1683 13.6
Total 751 5047 14.94. Determinants of the Demand for ACS
 First outcome variable: Proportion of returned 
application forms
1. Impact of the 50% voucher increase
 This result provides some support on the effect of financial 
incentives on health insurance demand
 It is consistent with previous studies that have shown the 
relevance of financial constraint to explain health insurance 
demand (Bundorf et Pauly, 2006 ; Saliba and Ventelou, 2007 ; Grignon and 
Kambia-Chopin, 2009 ; Jusot, Perraudin, Wittwer, 2009)
 But the proportion in the 2nd treated group is significantly lower 
than in the 1st treated group (pvalue = 0.01): and is not 
significantly different from the proportion in the control group 
(pvalue=0.532)
 One explanation may be that some individuals have considered 
the information meeting as a compulsory step to get ACS
194. Determinants of the demand for ACS
 First outcome variable: Proportion of returned 
application forms
2. Effect of the meeting participation
 People who attended the meeting, more often returned an 
application form
 This result needs further analysis, in particular,  we might have 
to control for self-selection issues
20
Treated 2 group Number of 
returned forms
Total number of 
individuals
%
Went to the meeting 37 142 26.1
Did not go to the meeting 192 1541 12.5
Total 229 1683 13.64. Determinants of the demand for ACS
 Second outcome variable: Proportion of ACS 
notifications
1. ACS notifications and refusals
 Sample of the experimented individuals were identified according 
to their recorded resources in 2007
 However assessment of ACS eligibility is based on the resources 
twelve months preceding the application.
 As the experiment started in Jan 2009, their resources might have 
change since Dec 2007
Therefore, it exists two reasons for ACS refusal
 Resources < ACS threshold  CMUC notification
 Resources > ACS upper limit ACS & CMUC refusals
 Note that individuals cover by group-contract were not count in 
the amount of application forms studied
214. Determinants of the demand for ACS
 Second outcome variable: Proportion of ACS 
notifications
2. ACS notifications
 The proportion of households  benefiting from the ACS in the two 
treated groups is significantly higher than in the control group 
(pvalue =0.015)
22







Control 112 6.7 46.5
Treated 1 160 9.5 56.9
Treated 2 131 7.8 57.2
Total 403 8.0 53.74. Determinants of the demand for ACS
 Second outcome variable: Proportion of ACS 
notifications
3. Cases of ACS refusal
 The proportion of households  benefiting from the ACS in the two 













Control 27 1.6 11.2 102 6.1 42.3
Treated 1 28 1.7 9.9 96 5.5 33.1
Treated 2 22 1.3 9.6 76 4.5 33.2
Total 77 1.5 10.3 271 5.4 36.1VARIABLES Total Control Treated 1 Treated 2
Groups
Control ref - - -
Treated 1 0.021* - - -
Treated 2 -0.009 - - -
Age -
- 25 years -0.069*** -0.07** -0.073** -0.072**
25 – 59 years -0.001 0.013 -0.051* 0.029
60 years & + ref ref ref ref
Is a woman -0.025** -0.026 -0.038* -0.013
CHI status in 
2008
Not cover ref ref ref ref
CMUC 0.113** -0.041 0.136 0.216*
cover 0.012 -0.000 0.006 0.028*
Probits for the probability of the demand for ACS: returned application 
forms (Marginal effects) Variables Total Control Treated 1 Treated 2
Insured family type
Single  adult ref ref ref ref
Single adult with children -0.026*** 0.015 -0.041* -0.052***
Couple 0.083** 0.136** 0.018 0.117*
Couple with children 0.002 0.128 -0.012 0.005
ALD cares in 2008 0.049*** 0.038 0.045* 0.061**
Health expenditures in 2008 
(average per individuals)
< =200€ -0.068*** -0.092*** -0.045 -0.06***
200€ - 500€ -0.051*** -0.049** -0.037 -0.066***
500€ - 1300€ -0.027** -0.032 -0.005 -0.042*
>=  1300€ ref ref ref ref
255. Determinants of meeting partipation & 
effect on the demand for ACS
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5. Conclusion5. Determinants of meeting participation
Variables mfx Variables mfx
Age  Insured family type
- 25 years -0.064*** Single adult ref
25 -59 years -0.031 Single adult with children 0.025
60 years & + ref Couple 0.054
Is a woman -0.011 Couple with children 0.053*
CHI Status in 2008  Health care expenditures in 2008 
(average per individuals)
Not cover ref <=200€ -0.051***
CMUC -0.039 200€ – 500€ -0.058***
cover -0.028* 500€ - 1300€ -0.024
>= 1300€ ref
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 Probit for the probability of meeting participation (treated 2)5. Impact of meeting on the demand of ACS
 Object: How to estimate the causal impact of meeting 
participation on the demand for ACS?
 Treatment is here define as meeting participation
 First method:  Matching (Rubin, 1974)
 Find two ‘identical’ individuals, one in the treated group and 
the other in the untreated group. 
 Assumptions:
 Conditional independence: 
 Selection on observables
 Common support: 
 Matching is most often used to estimate average treatment 
effect on the treated
285. Impact of meeting on the demand of ACS
 Suppose:       individuals with treatment and     without
treatment :
 W(i,j) is the weighting that compares individual i in the 
treatment group to individual j in the control group
 Nearest-neighbor matching:
 W(i, j)=1 si j = 
 Propensity score matching (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983):
 Instead of matching on all X, we can match on p(X)
295. Impact of meeting on the demand of ACS
 Propensity score matching (Rosenbaum et Rubin, 
1983):
 Estimate propensity score nonparametricaly or with a 
logit
 As shown by Irano, Imbens and Ridder, 2003:
30 Score de propension estimé à l’aide d’un logit sur 
la probabilité de participer à la réunion :
 Evaluation de l’effet de la réunion:





        phat        1683    .0843731     .042914   .0121345   .2166399
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
Probit for the probability of the demand for ACS (returned forms)
Variables mfx Variables mfx
Meeting 0.1047***
Age  Insured family type
- 25 years -0.066** Single adult ref
25 -59 years -0.032 Single adult with children -0.054***
60 years & + ref Couple 0.108
Is a woman -0.129 Couple with children 0.001
CHI Status in 2008  Health care expenditures 
in 2008 (average per 
individuals)
Not cover ref <=200€ -0.055**
CMUC 0.228* 200€ – 500€ -0.061***
cover 0.031* 500€ - 1300€ -0.039**
>= 1300€ ref
Matching:  Nnmatch:  ATE= 0.086*** ATET=0.107*** ATU=0.084***    =0.136***
Psmatch:  ATE= 0.089***  ATET= 0.108*** ATU=0.087***5. Impact of meeting on the demand of ACS
 Second method: bivariate probit
 In order to take into account the endogeneity of the meeting variable 
 Two latent variables:       for meeting participation and 
 for the demand for ACS
 The error terms follow a joint normal distribution function:
 d
325. Impact of meeting on the demand of ACS
 Third method: endogenous switching probit 
 In order to take into account the selection bias  (observables and 
unobservables) and estimate ATE,  ATT and ATU
 This model parameterizes the potential outcomes:

 An individual can only be in one regime, determined by a selection 
equation:
 With 
 The error terms follow a joint normal distribution function:
 d
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on the demand for ACSConclusion 
 The amount of the voucher and the information meeting have a significant 
impact on the demand for ACS
 However the proportion of households who returned an application form 
to get ACS is globally low.
 This is consistent with previous studies that have shown the weak impact 
of subvention on health insurance purchases (Auerbach & Ohri, 2006 ; Marquis & 
Long, 1995 ; Thomas, 1995)
 Limits:
 We don’t know how many individuals do finally use the voucher
 We only have information on reimbursed care  and CHI coverage 
(AMELI) recorded by the National health insurance fund.
 Next steps:
 Impact of the meeting: Control for potential selection bias on 
unobservables (by using information of survey data)
 Approximate voucher use by analyzing CHI cover rate after the 
experiment
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